Global Economic Prospects for Increasing Developing Country Migration into Developed Countries by van der Mensbrugghe, Dominique & Roland-Holst, David
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Global Economic Prospects for
Increasing Developing Country
Migration into Developed Countries
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe and David Roland-Holst
Development Prospects Group (DECPG), World Bank
1. October 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19233/





for Increasing Developing Country
Migration into Developed Countries
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe
and David Roland-Holst








for Increasing Developing Country
Migration into Developed Countries
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe
and David Roland-Holst
United Nations Development Programme  
Human Development Reports  













Global Economic Prospects for Increasing 




Dominique van der Mensbrugghe 
















Dominique van der Mensbrugghe is Lead Economist in the Development Prospects Group (DECPG) at the World 
Bank based in Washington, DC. E-mail: dvandermensbrugg@worldbank.org.  
 
David Roland-Holst is Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics. E-mail: dwrh@are.berkeley.edu. 
 
Comments should be addressed by email to the author(s). 
Abstract 
 
Global labor markets have evolved dramatically in the last several decades and will continue to 
so for some time to come, driven by changing population demographics, economic globalization, 
dramatic changes in transportation technology, and accelerating institutional change. All these 
characteristics of migration make it an essential policy issue for the human development agenda. 
The United Nations Human Development Report for 2009 intends to provide a forward-looking 
assessment of global labor market dynamics, with particular reference to the effects of increased 
labor mobility on global patterns of employment and output. To date, the most rigorous analysis 
of this subject is the World Bank Global Prospect Group’s forecasts with their Global Economic 
Prospects Linkage model. This report describes how an update of the GEP model captures more 
detailed information on global labor movements and heterogeneity, and reports new projections 
on global migration patterns.  
These results suggest complex market interactions between migrants and resident workers, 
whether native or migrant, and between labor and other factors of production. For example 
reducing migration raises the premium on migrant labor in the destination countries, while 
lowering the relative return to capital. The first effect makes for higher real income, 
consumption, and remittances for migrants of both types. For native populations in high income 
countries, the negative capital income effect dominates the wage effect of reduced competition 
from migrants. It is perhaps ironic that reducing labor competition is more beneficial to migrants, 
who lack the capital income and thereby gain absolutely from rising relative wages. Of course 
one of the primary demand drivers for migrants is the desire to profit from using capital 
resources more fully within high income economies. In OECD economies, pension schemes 
guarantee that a significant part of these profits accrue indirectly to native workers. Taken 
together, these results strongly support the argument that migration has beneficial growth effects 
on global real economic activity, improving the efficiency of international resource allocation for 
the benefit of both sending and receiving countries. However, these reassuring aggregate results 
mask more complex interactions in domestic labor markets, and there will inevitably be both 
winners and losers from the ensuing structural adjustments. Having said this, the existence of 
substantial aggregate gains, particularly new fiscal resources for the public sector, suggests the 
prospect of adjustment assistance to offset adverse impacts. 
 
Keywords: Migration, globalization, North-South. 
 
The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
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1 Introduction 
Global labor markets have evolved dramatically in the last several decades and will continue to 
so for some time to come, driven by changing population demographics, economic globalization, 
dramatic changes in transportation technology, and accelerating institutional change. The ever 
growing number of international migrants and the role they play in national, regional, and global 
economies has made migration a highly visible topic in recent years. Migration serves many 
purposes for those who make this decision, as well as for their families and other social group 
members, and their economies of origin and destination, as well as collateral markets, are 
changed by their movements. All these characteristics of migration make it an essential policy 
issue for the human development agenda.  
The United Nations Human Development Report for 2009 intends to provide a forward-looking 
assessment of global labor market dynamics, with particular reference to the effects of increased 
labor mobility on global patterns of employment and output. To date, the most rigorous analysis 
of this subject is the World Bank Global Prospect Group’s forecasts with their Global Economic 
Prospects Linkage model. The purpose of the proposed research is to update the GEP model to 
capture more detailed information on global labor movements and heterogeneity, and then to 
produce new projections for use in writing the HDR. 
The distinguishing feature of a general equilibrium model like Linkage is its closed form 
specification of all activities in the economic system under study. This can be contrasted with 
more traditional partial equilibrium analysis, where linkages to other domestic markets and 
agents are deliberately excluded from consideration. A large and growing body of evidence 
suggests that indirect effects (e.g., upstream and downstream production linkages) arising from 
policy changes are not only substantial, but may in some cases even outweigh direct effects. In a 
multi country model like the one used in this study, indirect effects include the trade linkages 
between countries and regions which themselves can have policy implications. Because 
migration affects so many markets, within and between economies, this is the appropriate tool of 
analysis to capture the full spectrum of benefits and costs. 
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The next section provides background information on global migration patterns, followed the 
policy scenarios and results analysis in Section 3. The report concludes with references and a 
technical annex. 
2 Overview of Migration Patterns and Processes 
Labor migration in recent years has been transformed by economic globalization, transportation 
technology, and pervasive institutional changes. Many of these more recent trends are 
fundamental to understanding future patterns of migration, so in this section we provide a brief 
overview of issues of most relevance to the present analysis. For more detailed discussion, the 
reader is referred to Martin (2009). We begin by discussing population dynamics, then review 
the role of migration in global labor markets, using examples from three leading migration 
theatres. This is followed by a brief discussion of migration infrastructure and related factors that 
shape migration decisions. Finally, the 2008-2009 recession and its impact on migration flows is 
discussed.  
2.1 Population 
Understanding trends in global population growth is crucial for predicting future migration 
flows. Developed countries’ populations are predicted to remain constant, and matched with an 
ageing population this creates an economically unproductive population pyramid. Immigrants 
can help bolster a depleting working-age population, and therefore future trends in migration are 
directly related to population trends.  
The best estimates for future global population come from The Population Division of the United 
Nations. Their flagship study on population, “World Population Prospects” was last revised in 
2006 and contains a wealth of information regarding population models. According to the “2006 
Revision”, the world population is expected to increase by approximately 2.5 billion people by 
2050 under medium bounds. This would increase the population from the current total of 6.7 
billion in 2006 to 9.2 billion. However, essentially all of this growth is expected to take place in 
the less developed regions of the world. Developing countries’ populations are projected to rise 
from 5.4 billion in 2007 to 7.9 billion by 2050.  In stark contrast, the population of developed 
countries are expected to remain flat at 1.2 billion and would actually decline in population were 
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it not for migration from less developed countries. Net migration from developing to developed 
countries is expected to average 2.3 million persons a year after 2010 (UN:2007). 
What is far more relevant to predicating future migration patterns are the rapidly changing 
population structures of the world. Due to declining fertility levels and increasing longevity, the 
populations of numerous countries are ageing rapidly. While this trend is happening nearly 
universally across the globe, it is most pronounced in developed countries. Between 2005 and 
2050, half of the increase in world population will be accounted for by a rise in the population 
aged 60 years or over, while the population aged 15 and under (considered children by the 
United Nations) will actually decline slightly. This trend is even more drastic in developed 
countries, where the population aged 60 or over is expected to nearly double (from 245 million 
in 2005 to 406 million in 2050), while the population aged under 60 is expected to decline (from 
971 million in 2005 to 839 million in 2050, UN:2007).  This has tremendous implications for 
migration and is worth examining in more detail. 
When looking at population ageing there are three distinct demographic transition categories. 
Developed countries represent the third and final stage of the transition and many have 
populations that are among the oldest in the world. Overall, the European continent is the oldest 
in the world with a median age of 39 years old. All but three countries (Albania, Ireland, and the 
Republic of Moldova) currently have a median age higher than 34 years and 12 countries have 
median ages higher than 40. Japan has the oldest population in the world with a median age of 43 
years in 2005. By 2050, all developed countries are expected to have median ages higher than 40 
years (UN:2007). 
The next transitional category consists of countries where the population of the working age 
(from 15 to 59 years) is still growing as a proportion of the whole population. Most countries in 
Asia and Latin America fill this category, although many are transitioning into the third category 
as well. Fertility reductions in both of these regions have been rapid, and as a result their 
populations are expected to age more rapidly than the population of developed countries. For 
example, in 37 of the 49 developing countries in Asia, the median age is expected to rise by at 
least 12 years between 2005 and 2050. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the median age is 
projected to increase by over 12 years in 32 of the 37 countries (UN:2007).  In terms of 
migration, it should come as no surprise that both Asia and Latin America have large migrant 
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populations, which is indicative of countries with a relatively large share of a working age 
population. However, over the next several decades as these countries transition into the third 
category (and continue to develop simultaneously) these migration patterns may reverse. 
Most African countries represent the first stage of the transition and their populations are still 
young. However, if predicted fertility models prove to be accurate, many African countries are 
poised to enter a period characterized by a beneficial age distribution, where the proportion of 
working age adults increases relative to that of dependants (children and elderly combined). 
Population ageing in Africa is expected to be moderate, as the median age is projected to rise by 
12 years in only 11 of the 54 countries in the continent and most are located in Northern Africa  
(UN:2007). In terms of migration, as Africa’s working age population continues to increase over 
the next several decades, so should their migrant populations.   
Table 1: Percent Distribution by broad age group for the world, development groups and 
major areas, 2005 and 2050 (medium variant) 
 
Source: “World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. Population Ageing,”  
 
These changes in the median age are the result of changes in the share of population in different 
age groups. When looking at the shares of population in different age groups the importance of 
migrants can be seen even further. In developed countries in 2050, the percentage of people aged 
60 and older is expected to be double the amount of children. In other words, this means that for 
every one child there will be two people 60 or older. Furthermore the proportion of the working 
age population is expected to decrease in every major region besides Africa (Table 1). This is 
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useful for examining the support ratio, which is calculated as the ratio of persons aged 15-64 
over the sum of the number of children and of persons 65 or over. The support ratio is expected 
to begin declining after 2010 in Europe, North America and Oceania, after 2015 in Asia and after 
2025 in Latin America and the Caribbean. By 2050, Europe is predicted to have the lowest 
support ratio, at 14 persons of working age for every 10 dependents. These decreasing support 
ratios highlight the significant need for the working age population in future decades, and 
therefore migration can play a necessary role in ensuring many countries do not become over 
burdened (UN:2007).  
Table 2: Economically Active Population / Thousands 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
World 3181784 3229431 3276145 3321820 3366449 
MDC's 613402 615741 617614 618980 619848 
LDC's 2568382 2613689 2658531 2702840 2746601 
      
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
World 3409966 3452308 3493424 3533211 3571670 
MDC's 620279 620362 620169 619729 619048 
LDC's 2789687 2831946 2873255 2913482 2952622 
      
 2018 2019 2020   
World 3608986 3645447 3681278   
MDC's 618156 617078 615838   
LDC's 2990830 3028369 3065440   
      





2.2 Labor Force 
The Population Division of the United Nations lumps the age group 15-59 into the working age 
category, but this is not technically accurate due to labor force participation rates. Therefore to 
get a more accurate figure of the size of the global labor force, we must take into account labor 
force participation rates. However, this proves to be quite difficult as many countries do not 
report these rates and therefore they must be estimated. The International Labor Organization 
(ILO) of the United Nations undertakes this responsibility and has created five reports estimating 
and projecting the economically active population (EAP). The most recent report, released in 
August 2008, contains a wealth of statistics on the EAP subset of the population. In 2008, the 
total EAP was estimated at 3.18 billion or roughly 47% of the total world population. In 
developed countries, the EAP in 2008 was 613 million accounting for approximately 19% of the 
total EAP. The corresponding EAP in developing countries was about 2.5 billion people. The 
ILO projections for the future EAP are only estimated until 2020, but are useful nonetheless. The 
ILO estimates that the EAP in developed countries is to remain stable at approximately 600 
million, while the EAP in developing countries is expected to increase by 500 million. Again this 
highlights the significant potential for migration, as the developing world will be essentially 
adding a labor force that is equal to the size of the developed world’s entire labor force over the 
next decade (Table 2).    
2.3 Replacement Migration 
The shift in population demographics is believed to be permanent, meaning the world is unlikely 
to return to one where there are several children for every adult. One possible theory that has 
been presented to reduce the economic and social burden of an ageing population has been 
replacement migration. Replacement migration is not a full solution; it must be used in 
conjunction with raising fertility levels and creating incentives for residents to work longer. 
However, as a partial solution replacement migration is an important policy tool, and thus a 
wealth of literature exists on the subject. A United Nations piece, entitled “Replacement 
Migration: Is it A Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?” is the most influential and 
widely discussed paper on the subject. According to the UN, population size and demographics 
depend on three components: fertility, mortality, and net international migration. As there are no 
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policies feasible to increase mortality, this leaves only two possible ways to reverse the role of 
changing population demographics.  However, the low-fertility levels of developed countries 
suggest there is no reason to assume fertility levels will return to above-replacement levels. 
Furthermore, although many countries have introduced a variety of fertility increasing measures, 
the long-term effectiveness of such policies is thought to be extremely limited.  
The UN creates five different scenarios, but the most relevant is scenario V which is used to 
compute the number of migrants needed to maintain a healthy ratio of working age to elderly 
populations, also known as the potential support ratio (PSR).  This scenario shows that 
replacement levels of migration would have to be significantly higher than current levels in order 
to maintain a PSR of 3 or more. For example, for the EU this calls for almost 2.8 million 
immigrants a year, which is 9.4 times, expected levels. Keep in mind this is only in order to have 
a PSR of 3 or more. To maintain current PSR levels the numbers of migrants become so large 
that the UN considers them unrealistic. The Republic of Korea demonstrates this impossibility, 
as it calls for 5.1 billion migrants needed to maintain its 1995 PSR (Table 3).   
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Table 3: Net Number of Migrants, 1995-2050, by Scenario and Country or Region 
(Thousands) 
 
Source: “Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?” 
 
Not only do these numbers of migrants seem impossibly high, but they do not even solve the 
problem entirely. As migrants move to other countries and become permanent citizens, they too 
will age and become eligible for government pension systems. Thus immigration must increase 
over time or otherwise demographical shifts will continue with each generation. Furthermore, 
immigration is a highly opinionated topic and many citizens in host countries would be against 
significantly increased flows of migrants. Critics’ complaints are numerous but most often 
include the charge the immigrants take much-needed jobs for local workers, or that immigrants 
tend to have higher levels of unemployment and can lead to social problems such as violence and 
drug abuse (Martin 2009). 
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2.4 Supply and Demand: Migrant Motivation and the Need for Migrants 
There are two major labor market forces today that drive work-based migration. First, many 
people of working age either cannot find employment or cannot find adequate employment to 
support themselves and their families in their own countries.  Estimates from 2003 show that 
1.39 billion people work full time, but are still unable to lift themselves and their families above 
the $2 USD a day poverty line. Among them, 550 million do not even earn more than the $1 
USD extreme poverty line. This correlates to a staggering 49.7% of the world’s workers (and 
58.7% of the developing world's workers) who are not earning enough to lift themselves above 
the standard poverty line (“World Employment Report 2004-2005: Chapter 1 Global Trends in 
Employment, Productivity and Poverty”). Second, some countries have a shortage of workers to 
fill positions in various sectors of their economies, or their working age population is steadily 
ageing without adequate replacement levels. These push and pull factors are perhaps the most 
important, but other factors influence migrations as well, such as demographic change, socio-
economic and political crises, and widening wage gaps within, as well as between developed and 
developing countries (ILO:2007). Put much more simply however, migrants seek opportunity. 
When looking at rural-urban migration, if people can find opportunities within their own 
country, they do not cross national borders. This can be seen clearly in China, as there is a 
significant amount of rural-urban migration within China, but almost no migration from China to 
other countries. However, when rural-urban migrants cannot find employment opportunities in 
their own country they are much more likely to cross national boarders (Martin 2009).  
2.5 International Migration 
While there has been a wealth of information written on specific topics related to migration, 
there has been surprisingly little done to quantify the patterns of international migration between 
countries and regions. While both the OECD and UN produce data, these represent a global 
perspective and lack truly comprehensive and reliable data on bilateral flows of migration.  
Perhaps the most comprehensive report comes from the World Bank and was written by Parsons 
et al. (2007). Their report entitled, “Quantifying International Migration: A Database of Bilateral 
Migrant Stocks” introduces four versions of an international bilateral migration stock database 
for 226 by 226 countries and territories.  Parsons et al. estimate a total of 175.7 million 
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international migrants using data from 2000-2002, which is consistent with UN estimates at 175 
million in 2000. The United States is the largest recipient of migrants with 35 million, or roughly 
12.5% of its total population. Australia, Canada, and Saudi Arabia all show higher percentages, 
while Western Europe is slightly smaller. Looking at developing countries, India, Pakistan, Iran, 
and Cote d’Ivoire all have high levels of immigration. In regards to emigration, Mexico, 
Afghanistan and Morocco all show major outflows in proportionate terms, while India and 
Bangladesh have large emigrate populations in absolute terms. Developed countries are also 
important sources as well, with the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and the United States all in 
the top 15 (Table 4)1
 
. 
Table 4:  Share of Migrant Population in Total And from/to Neighboring Country 
 
                                                        
1 The information from table 4 does not include Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as they are deemed not 
representative of normal migration behavior. The USSR had significant internal mobility and when it split up many of 
the people were recorded as migrants.  
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Source: Parsons et al 
 
2.6 Leading Theaters of Migration 
While migration is a global demographic phenomenon, some geographic theaters exhibit more 
intensive and sustained migratory flux, either as sending regions, recipients, or both. These areas 
are doubling important to elucidating broader migration trends. They represent a large proportion 
of total migration, and closer examination of their dynamics provides guidance regarding 
emerging trends elsewhere. We review three salient examples of migration theaters. 
Looking at specific countries, Mexico, Morocco, and The Philippines prove to be useful case 
studies for understanding migration patterns because they represent large emigrating countries in 
three unique regions.  Starting first with Mexico, bilateral flows from Mexico to the United 
States are the largest in the world. The actual number of Mexican migrants into the United States 
are hard to estimate due to large levels of illegal immigration, but most recent estimates place the 
total number around 12 million, meaning that approximately 10% of the total Mexican 
population of 120 million has migrated to the United States. The reasons for such large migration 
levels are many, but again understanding the population dynamics is an important first step. Back 
in 1970, Mexico only had a population of 50 million, with 750,000 Mexican migrants in the 
United States (or 1.5% of the population). However, by 2000 Mexico’s population had surged to 
Mexico-United States Migration 
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twice the size and its migrants to the United States had increased over 13 times, to 10 million 
(Martin 2009). While rapid population growth in Mexico matched with declining opportunities 
was partly responsible for this tremendous migrant growth, the overall story is more complex.  
Mexico is a rapidly urbanization country, but it still remains poor, especially compared to the 
United States.  Furthermore, Mexico has a large rural population and the Mexican government 
has struggled with creating formal sector jobs. Moreover, there has been a long history of 
linkages to the United States labor market (most noticeably the Bracero program from 1942 – 
1964). But perhaps the most telling part of the story is that the border between the United States 
and Mexico separates the largest gap in per capita GNI in the world (The World Bank’s 
indicators place Mexican per capita GNI at $8,340 USD versus $46,040 USD in the United 
States in 2007). Therefore, for many Mexicans the gain from leaving rural Mexico is quite large 
and they can often earn wages that are 8 to 10 times larger than ones they would receive 
domestically. Again the story of migration returns to the story of opportunity. Not only are 
wages significantly higher just across the border, but also there is a large amount of opportunity 
demonstrated by the fact that from 2000 to 2006, the employment of Mexicans in the United 
States rose just as much as formal sector employment in Mexico (Martin 2009). 
Morocco has a large emigrant population and people of Moroccan origin have emerged as one of 
the largest migrant communities in Western Europe. Of Morocco’s 31 million people, over 2 
million have migrated to Europe alone.  Historically, Morocco was a migrant receiving country, 
but the French Colonization of Algeria (and later Morocco) marked a new era of economic 
restructuring and Morocco first began to send migrants. During Morocco’s colonial period (and 
immediate post-colonial) it saw steady migration to France and Algeria, but the real story of 
modern Moroccan migrants began in the 1950’s and 1960’s during Western Europe’s rapid 
economic growth. This strong economic growth in Europe increased its demand for low-skilled 
labor, which Morocco was able to supply. During this time, Morocco singed labor recruitment 
agreements with several European countries including Germany (1963), France (1963), Belgium 
(1964), and the Netherlands (1969). Between 1965 and 1972, Moroccan emigration exploded, 
increasing from 30,000 to 300,000 and by 1975 there was an estimated 400,000 migrants (de 
Haas 2005).   
Morocco-Europe Migration 
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Although these migrants were considered “guest-workers” and their migration only temporary, 
most migrants did not return after 1973. This was due to failed coups in 1971 and 1972 that 
produced an era of economic instability and repression. In fact, after the guest worker programs 
ended in 1973-74, migration continued to increase due to family unification. Moreover, large 
amounts of migration to Spain and Italy explain why Moroccan emigration has increased despite 
the end of the original guest worker programs and increasingly restrictive immigration policies. 
By 2005, Moroccan migrants in Europe totaled approximately 2.3 million, representing a 
sevenfold increase since 1972.  France is home to the largest legal Moroccan migrant community 
(1,025,000 in 2005), followed by Spain (397,000), The Netherlands (315,000), Italy (287,000), 
Belgium (215,000), and Germany (99,000) (de Haas 2005).   
Most recently, Morocco has emerged as a regional hub for migrants headed to Europe, especially 
for sub-Saharan Africans. It is estimated that several tens of thousands of sub-Saharan Africans 
migrate to Spain from Morocco and then into Europe. Once in Morocco, illegal migrants attempt 
to enter the Spanish cities Cueta and Melilla by scaling the tall boarder fences separating these 
cities from Morocco. Unfortunately, many sub-Saharan migrants face aggressive Moroccan and 
Spanish border authorities, and they are often socially and economically marginalized drawing 
protests from human rights organizations (de Haas 2005).  
Future Moroccan migration is expected to continue at high levels, due to high levels of demand 
for migrant labor in Western Europe matched with high youth unemployment and low wages in 
Morocco. However this continued drain of working age populations might result in decreased 
potential for emigration in the long run (de Haas 2005). 
The Philippines is the largest migrant sending country in Asia, with over 1.7 million legal 
workers abroad in 2007 according to official sources (“2007 Survey on Overseas Filipinos”). 
Moreover, migration has become an important element of the Filipino economy and society as 
over half of Filipinos have worked abroad or have a relative who is or was abroad. The very first 
Filipino migrants were men, often employed as support personnel by the United States military 
contractors during the Viet Nam war. However, large levels of migration began as a reaction to 
oil shocks in 1973-74 that decreased economic growth and produced high levels of 
Filipino Migration 
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unemployment. While most of the beginning migrants were men, by the early 1980’s an 
increasing share had become women that were going abroad to provide health care in private 
homes (Martin 2009).  
As is often the case, estimating true levels of migrants can be difficult.  While the Philippines 
official, “2007 Survey on Overseas Filipinos” places the total number of migrants at 1.75 
million; other sources claim this number is higher. For example, the World Bank estimates the 
total stock of Filipino migrants at 3.6 million in 2006, and unofficial sources indicate the number 
could be as high as 8 million (Dilip and Xu 2008 and Collymore 2003). There is also some 
debate as to which country is home to the most Filipino migrants. According to the Filipino 
government, Saudi Arabia has the largest migrant community with 19.8% of total overseas 
Filipino workers (OFWs) in 2007. Other large migrant receiving countries and regions include 
United Arab Emirates (12.1%), North and South America (9.3%), Europe (9.2%), Hong Kong 
(6.7%), Singapore (6%), Japan (5.6%) and Taiwan (5.5%) (GOP:2008). The World Bank 
however estimates that the United States is the top migrant receiving country and Malaysia, 
Australia, Guam, and The Republic of Korea are also in the top ten (Dilip and Xu 2008). The 
Filipino government’s survey found that there were more male OFWs (50.9%) than females 
(49.1%) during 2007. 
While there is debate among the exact numbers of Filipino migrants, the story of how the 
Philippines became a large migrant sending country is clear. For several decades the Philippines 
has seen declining economic indicators. In 1960, the Philippines was the second wealthiest 
country per capita in Asia, only behind Japan. However due to years of strict import-substitution 
policy, the Philippines did not enjoy large flows of FDI as did several other Southeast Asian 
countries.  Furthermore, rampant corruption and complicated tax laws have severely limited 
investment in infrastructure and other pro-growth policies have been routinely blocked in 
congress leading to a low savings rate and high levels of domestic and foreign debt (Martin 
2009). Despite all this, the Philippines is rapidly urbanizing, growing from an urban population 
of 31.8% in 1970 to 47% in 1990 (SPPR 2004). These high levels of urbanization have lead to 
crowded cities, and matched with years of economic failures, many rural citizens see migration 
as an attractive alternative to better their lives.  
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2.7 Migration Infrastructure 
Migration infrastructure plays a key role in facilitating individuals to migrate, because the more 
streamlined the process is, the easier it is for migrants to move. Migration infrastructure includes 
any number of institutions such as employers seeking migrants, public employment services that 
can match local workers with foreign jobs, social networks, and private recruiters. One such 
example of a public employment service, and arguably the most advanced is in the Philippines, 
as the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration established in 1982 has become a crucial 
part of the country’s Department of Labor and Employment (Chamie 2009).  However, the 
overall trend recently has been the decline of direct employer recruitment and public 
employment, and the rise of migration agents and migration networks.   
Out of all the networks, perhaps the least is known about migration agents, which is unfortunate 
as agents also have most potential to exploit migrant workers. However Martin (2005 and 2009) 
has identified three policy recommendations to help ensure agents play an effective role in 
migration rather than exploit individuals. First, governments must set up enforcement to 
eliminate corrupt agents by requiring all agents to register themselves with authorities. This 
includes processes such as requiring agents to past tests of appropriate laws and providing 
financial security for clients if agents do not fulfill their promises.  Second, there must be 
incentives for legitimate agents to get into migrant brokerage business so that competition will 
lead to self-regulation and provide ratings. This will grant migrants more options and allow 
clients to select more legitimate agents. 
Migration Agents 
Third, governments must increase the role of public employment service agencies, which will 
create minimum standards in recruitment and deployment that must be met by private agents. 
Globalization has played a significant role in shaping migration networks, thanks to the sudden 
and sharp rise of communications, transportation, and human rights protection. As a result of 
increased communications, potential migrants can easily and quickly learn about opportunities 
abroad. Here, the role of social networks is especially important as family members and friends 
Migration Networks 
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are easily able to pass along information to others back home in a context that is understandable. 
The media also plays a part as well, as it can glorify lifestyles in the developed world, which 
creates strong impressions on a young migrants mind. In an increasingly globalized world, 
transportation costs have significantly shrunk. Whereas it once took a vast amount of money to 
cross oceans, today transportation costs are typically less than $2,500 to travel anywhere in the 
world legally, and $1,000 to $20,000 to cross borders illegally (Martin 2009). Although $20,000 
still represents a large amount to poor individuals, migrants are able to pay back high smuggling 
fees generally within two to three years, representing a drastically shorter payback time than 
many years ago (Kyle and Koslowski 2001). Finally, human rights increases have allowed 
migrants more protection after immigrating. Many of the large migrant receiving countries have 
ratified different resolutions from the UN, ILO, and other conventions, which grant basic human 
rights to migrants. This gives further incentives to migrants as it allows them to stay in foreign 
countries longer and receive numerous social safety nets while awaiting decisions on their 
applications for asylum (Martin 2009).    
2.8 Migration and the 2008-2009 Global Recession 
The recession that began in the United States in December 2007 and has spread to the global 
economy has many implications for migration. Although in the long run, migration trends can be 
expected to continue, the recession will surely affect migration flows in the near future. 
Generally speaking, the migration of individuals to developed countries is expected to slow both 
from employers requesting fewer workers as a result of job losses, and some governments 
halting the direct recruitment of foreign workers.  
In terms of migrant stocks, there is insignificant data to prove that the number of migrants in 
developed countries has declined so far. However, return migration is believed to correlate more 
with the economic, social, and political development in the countries of origin, than with the 
economic conditions in receiving countries. Therefore, it is believed that migrant stocks should 
not decline significantly, especially if migrant-sending countries’ economies are shrinking as 
well. That being said, many immigrants are vulnerable during recessions as they are generally 
young, have lower levels of education, and have made recent entry into the labor force, which 
are all characteristics of the labor force that will be hit the hardest.  
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Moreover, immigrants are also highly overrepresented in many of industries that have 
experienced large job losses, such as construction, manufacturing, leisure and hospitality, and 
support and personal services. Conversely however, immigrants (especially recent immigrants) 
may be able to adjust more quickly than native-born workers because they are better suited to 
change industries and jobs, as well as relocate residency, as they often do not have established 
roots. In the United States, legal flows of migrants are expected to continue at the same rate 
because the process often takes years and the system is notoriously backlogged (Papademetriou 
and Terrazas 2009).   
2.9 Conclusion 
While replacement migration may not be a full solution to changing population demographics, it 
will certainly have a role and migration should be expected to continue. When forecasting future 
of flows of migrants, key aspects to consider are countries with citizens that stand the most to 
gain from increased opportunity, proximity to developed or emerging markets, and strong 
migration infrastructure making the process streamlined and easy.  Over the next several 
decades, countries that are in the second transitional category discussed earlier (such as 
numerous countries in Asia and Latin America) will transition into the final and third category. 
This means that many of these traditionally migrant sending countries will become migrant 
receiving countries as their populations’ age and they become more developed. Those that will 
fill their role will come from surrounding countries that are in the first transitional category. 
Africa is the largest country in this category, and therefore its role as an important migrant 
sending country is surely bound to increase in future decades.  
3  Forecasting Migration Patterns in a Global Framework 
After an overview of recent migration trends, we examine future patterns of migration with a 
global economic forecasting model. The framework we use is the Linkage model, established at 
the World Bank’s as its standard tool for economic projections.2
                                                        
2 See van der Mensbrugghe (2006) for a detailed description of the standard model. 
 A state-of-the-art dynamic 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, Linkage has been used extensively over the last 
decade for long-term economic analysis of structural issues such as the impacts from a potential 
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Doha Round agreement, regional trade agreements, and a variety of leading issues related to 
growth dynamics. The model was significantly enhanced for the World Bank’s annual Global 
Economic Prospects 2006 to include international migration and remittances. A technical annex 
below describes the changes to the model and the derivation of the welfare analysis that 
underpins the key findings emerging from the analysis of changes in the patterns of international 
migration. 
In this study, we update the 2006 GEP projections with more recent and detailed data on 
migration patterns. The underlying data supporting this update of Linkage was prepared by a 
joint effort of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) at Purdue University and researchers 
based at Sussex University in the UK. GTAP is providing the core data in a format compatible 
with its global data base. This data provides a bilateral flow of migrants—at both skilled and 
unskilled level—and the associated matrix of bilateral remittances. This core data is used to 
calibrate a new set of equations in the Linkage model that incorporates a more complex labor 
market and includes the new remittance flows. At the moment, the national stocks of migrants 
are not explained by the model, i.e. they are exogenous.  
More specifically, the country specific economic data and the migration database are part of the 
GTAP release 6.2 posted June, 2006. The data has a 2001 base year and it is evaluated in $2001 
at market exchange rates. Using this information, Linkage as used to update its baseline 
projections from the 2006 analysis in two ways. We revised the baseline scenario to line up with 
observed history (for GDP and population) through 2008 and the World Bank's forecast for 2009 
and beyond. We also revised the PPP exchange rates to be consistent with the ICP estimates. The 
PPP exchange rates are not incorporated into the base data of the model because, for consistency 
reasons, Linkage does all of its calculations in $2001. We use the PPP exchange rates to re-
evaluate the welfare gains (only for that part of the income migrants get in their new homes that 
is not remitted.)Though the migration database is part of the GTAP release, most of the 
underlying data comes from current UN sources, complemented with national sources and 
reconciled by a team based at Sussex. The result is the most up-to-date, integrated global 
economic and labor flow database currently available. 
 
 19 
3.1 Scenarios for Migration and Economic Growth 
Before presenting alternative scenarios for future migration trends, a few observations can 
usefully be made about how migration affects economic activity. For sending and receiving 
economies, migration obviously changes absolute and relative labor supplies, but in an 
international context it should be recognized that migration changes the underlying resource 
situation and affects international division of labor. To the extent that migration permits more 
efficient international matching of factors of production within economies, both national and 
global real output can rise. This fact is often overlooked in the political debate about immigrants 
displacing domestic workers and emigrants depleting stocks of domestic human capital (e.g. 
brain drain).  
While migration itself is influenced by many complex institutional factors, it is useful to 
distinguish between two generic types, associated with different basic impetus to migrate. The 
first can be termed opportunity migration, where movement is motivated by a real or perceived 
difference in the real return to one’s human capital. The second major impetus can be called 
distress migration, where movement is motivated by aversion to negative local circumstances, 
including crisis, persecution, or something else that drives a migrant out without direct reference 
to relative economic returns. Of course there are many intermediate cases between a detached 
rate of return decision and blind flight from adversity, but in our analysis we focus on the first 
category since it is thought to represent the primary determinant of modern international 
migration.  
Opportunity migration is important to the global economy because it reflects underlying 
inefficiencies in global factor markets. In other words, in a world with no barriers to the flow of 
goods, services, and capital, long term efficiency would be attained along with factor price 
equalization. In the real world, substantial and persistent real wage differences exist for the same 
labor capabilities, and for this reason opportunity migration can bring output closer to its 
potential. For example, replacement migration discussed earlier represents relative labor scarcity 
induced by declining working age populations, and this scarcity is accompanied by a wage 
premium relative to that of eligible workers in sending countries. If the latter migrate, they 
capture the opportunity for higher real living standards, but also expand production possibilities 
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for the destination economy. The may be an offsetting decline in the sending country, but the 
migrant’s higher real returns may also increase origin country income via remittances.  
More generally, returns to capital between countries differ in ways that suggest mobility of this 
factor is much more limited that it would be under assumptions of perfect competition. This may 
be because of national risk factors or other institutional realties that markets are discounting, but 
in any case labor mobility can at least partially offset these distortions and other market failures 
to increase productive efficiency. 
Obviously, these are complex interactions, and their ultimate economic impacts must be seen as 
an empirical question. For this reason, we apply the Linkage model, evaluating scenarios for 
changing destination workforces, with corresponding induced migration flows, to determine their 
economic impacts on sending and receiving countries, as well as the global economy. As we 
have already mentioned, the stocks and flows of migrants (i.e. individual decisions to participate 
in the labor force and to migrate) are not modeled in Linkage but taken as exogenous.  
To take account of uncertainties regarding actual flows, we assess several alternatives. The 
reference scenario calls for increasing in the number of migrants from low and middle income 
sending countries to achieve a fixed percent increase in high income country labor forces. To be 
precise, we model this by assuming that the stock of migrants in each destination country rises, 
above the baseline stock in a given year, by the amount required to increase the total domestic 
work force by a specified percent, debiting the working population in the sending countries by 
the same amount. Thus the stock changes in the destination countries are exogenously, while 
labor stock and outbound migrant flow changes from sending countries are calculated residually 
from baseline shares. Finally, we assume this process is phased in (linearly) over the ten period 
2010-2020, with destination stocks at the fixed higher percent over 2020-2025.  
We assess four alternatives to Business as Usual (BAU, meaning constant shares of migrants in 
the destination population) over the period 2010-2025, assuming institutional or other events 
change the eligibility and impetus for migration. In particular, Scenarios 1 assumes migrant 
flows from low and middle income to high income countries rise to achieve 5% growth of the 
total destination labor force between 2010 and 2020 (respectively) and remain at these levels 
until 2025. These results are then “bracketed” by scenarios for flows that achieve destination 
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total workforce growth of 3% and 8%, respectively. Finally, a fourth scenario assumes the trend 
runs in reverse, with global migration flows
3.2 Results  
 shrinking by -50% over the same time intervals.  
The following tables summarize macroeconomic impacts of the migration scenarios set forth 
above. Although the GTAP database details over 100 distinct economies and regions, for 
convenience we consider two generic classes of economies as global groups. The acronym HIC 
denotes the high income countries, basically represented by the OECD. The remainder of the 
global economy is comprised of Lower and Middle Income Countries (LMIC). For a given 
migration scenario, the primary macroeconomic impacts are measureable in terms of domestic 
real income and consumption, private and public, as well as international transfers effected by 
migrant remittances. These are detailed in the tables. 
Consider for example Table 5, which represents the 5% trend increase in global migration. In 
this case, by 2025, we see that the global economy benefits substantially from expanded 
migration activity. In particular, global real income would be nearly one trillion USD higher by 
2025. Both HIC and LMIC benefit in real income and consumption terms, although incumbent 
migrants in HIC experience lower incomes because of wage competition from new migrants. For 
natives in HIC, domestic income rises because new migrants increase real output potential.  
New migrants also finance a substantial amount of new government spending in their destination 
economies, equal to over one third (153/539) of their own income gains. Because their real 
incomes fall, prior migrants reduce their remittances (35 billion), but these outflows are more 
than offset by new migrant remittances (-156 billion). The latter make a vital contribution to their 
economies of origin, equal to over 60% (156/212) of real consumption growth there. In this way, 
new migrants more than compensate for their absence. Meanwhile, the actual economic benefit 
to new migrants may be overstated by comparing their new consumption levels to prior home 
consumption, where one USD has greater purchasing power. The second sub-table brackets this 
welfare effect by discounting the new migrant consumption and income differences by PPP. In 
reality the welfare effect will be somewhere in between these outcomes, but qualitatively they 
are completely in agreement. 
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In comparison to the original (2006) World Bank results, there are two major differences in the 
present analysis: 
1. The baseline is quite different with lower growth in the HICs and higher in the 
developing. This reduces the gap in net wage compared to the 2006 baseline and 
therefore lowers the overall gains. At the world level, the net gains decline from $356 
billion (in 2005, PPP adjusted, see Table 2.3 page 34 in GEP 06), to $300 billion.  
2. The switch to the new PPPs takes it back to $355 billion (I did not target this!). Since the 
new PPPs exhibit higher prices in developing countries than the old PPPs, the PPP 
adjustment is reduced. (If a HH gained $9000--with a PPP of 4, the gain was reduced to 
$2250, with a PPP of 2.5 the gain is now $3600. We can produce a table showing the 
changes in PPP by region and showing the 'migration' weighted change in the PPP. In the 
US for example, where most of the migrants are from Mexico and Central America, the 
PPP change was pretty minor.) 
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Table 5: Macroeconomic Effects of 5% Destination Workforce Growth3
 
 
(differences from baseline in 2025) 
 
Consumption 
  Billions of 2006 USD Private Public Total Income Remittance 
HIC 
Natives 194 -4 190 189 1 
Prior Migrants -130 0 -130 -165 35 
New Migrants 539 153 692 848 -156 
LMIC Natives 188 24 212 92 120 
Global 
 
791 173 964 964 0 
       
  
Consumption 
  PPP 2006 USD Billions Private Public Total Income Remittance 
HIC 
Natives 194 -4 190 189 1 
Prior Migrants -130 0 -130 -165 35 
New Migrants 237 62 299 456 -156 
LMIC Natives 188 24 212 92 120 
Global 
 
490 81 571 571 0 
  
 
To appraise the relative magnitudes of scenario changes and outcomes, we conducted two 
sensitivity comparison experiments, varying the growth rate of migration to achieve total 
destination labor force growth of 3% and 8% respectively. The counterpart results are presented 
in Tables 6 and 7 below. While all effects are essentially monotonic in the magnitude of 
migration flows, one might expect the benefits to rise at a decreasing rate because of diminishing 
returns. Figure 2 compares three important impact variables across the three scenarios, HIC and 
LMIC aggregate incomes and total Remittances, each measured as real (2006) USD variation                                                         
3 This scenario assumes that the stock of migrants in each destination country rises by the amount required to 
increase the total domestic work force of the destination country by 5 percent between 2010 and 2020 and remains 
constant between 2020 and 2025, implying a significant rise in the number of migrants as a share of the population in 
the destination country . The alternative baseline scenario assumes that migrants as a share of the population at 
destination remain constant between 2010 and 2025. The difference in outcomes (consumption and income levels in 
the year 2025) under both scenarios are then compared for migrants and natives to yield net gains or losses for each 
group. 
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from baseline trends in the year 2025. Because of scale disparity between the two economic 
regions, two different axes are used (left for HIC and right for LMIC and remittances).  
 
Table 6: Macroeconomic Effects of 3% Destination Workforce Growth 
(differences from baseline in 2025) 
  
Consumption 
  Billions of 2006 USD Private Public Total Income Remittance 
HIC 
Natives 121 -4 117 116 1 
Prior Migrants -89 0 -89 -113 24 
New Migrants 345 97 443 542 -100 
LMIC Natives 119 15 134 58 75 
Global 
 
496 108 604 604 0 
       
  
Consumption 
  PPP 2006 USD Billions Private Public Total Income Remittance 
HIC 
Natives 121 -4 117 116 1 
Prior Migrants -89 0 -89 -113 24 
New Migrants 153 40 193 293 -100 
LMIC Natives 119 15 134 58 75 
Global 
 
304 51 355 355 0 
 
Table 7: Macroeconomic Effects of 8% Destination Workforce Growth 
(differences from baseline in 2025) 
  
Consumption 
  Billions of 2006 USD Private Public Total Income Remittance 
HIC 
Natives 299 -2 297 295 2 
Prior Migrants -178 0 -179 -227 48 
New Migrants 798 227 1,025 1,258 -232 
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LMIC Natives 281 38 319 136 183 
Global 
 
1,200 262 1,462 1,462 0 
       
  
Consumption 
  PPP 2006 USD Billions Private Public Total Income Remittance 
HIC 
Natives 299 -2 297 295 2 
Prior Migrants -178 0 -179 -227 48 
New Migrants 347 90 437 670 -232 
LMIC Natives 281 38 319 136 183 
Global 
 
748 125 874 874 0 
 
Figure 1: Scenario Comparison of Macroeconomic Aggregates 
 
 
Several important insights emerge from this sensitivity exercise. Firstly, aggregate benefits to the 
HIC countries are much larger in all scenarios. Second, the gains to both regions increase at an 
increasing rate with the scale of migration. This suggests that unexploited global factor market 
efficiencies are far from being fully realized. Moreover, the benefits to HIC are clearly the driver 
of the other two outcomes, accelerating remittances with commensurate income growth in the 
sending countries.  
 26 
Table 8: Macroeconomic Effects of 50% Migration Reduction 
(differences from baseline in 2025) 
  
Consumption 
  Billions of 2006 USD Private Public Total Income Remitance 
HIC 
Natives -159 -528 -687 -687 -1 
Prior Migrants 209 -39 170 225 -55 
New Migrants 1,328 378 1,706 2,083 -377 
LMIC Natives 386 55 441 8 433 
Global 
 
1,764 -134 1,630 1,630 0 
       
  
Consumption 
  PPP 2006 USD Billions Private Public Total Income Remitance 
HIC 
Natives -159 -528 -687 -687 -1 
Prior Migrants 209 -39 170 225 -55 
New Migrants 613 162 775 1,152 -377 
LMIC Natives 386 55 441 8 433 
Global 
 
1,048 -350 698 698 0 
 
As an alternative reference case, we consider the consequences of substantially reducing 
migration flows. For this scenario, we assume that migration falls from baseline trends by a full 
50%, declining linearly between 2010 and 2020 and remaining constant at half of baseline values 
for 2021-2025. As the results in Table 8 indicate, the projections strongly support the economic 
fundamentals behind international migration, but the impacts on different stakeholders are 
asymmetric. In particular, HIC native populations are actually worse off and incumbent migrants 
better off, the opposite of the expanding migration scenarios, while new migrants gain even 
more.  
The reason for these variegated results is symmetry in the underlying factor market adjustments. 
Simply put, reducing migration raises the premium on migrant labor in the destination countries, 
while lowering the relative return to capital. The first effect makes for higher real income, 
consumption, and remittances for migrants of both types. For HIC native populations, the 
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negative capital income effect dominates the wage effect of reduced competition from migrants. 
It is perhaps ironic that reducing labor competition is more beneficial to migrants, who lack the 
capital income and thereby gain absolutely from rising relative wages. Of course one of the 
primary demand drivers for migrants is .the desire to profit from using capital resources more 
fully within high income economies. In OECD economies, pension schemes guarantee that a 
significant part of these profits accrue indirectly to native workers. 
Taken together, these results strongly support the argument that migration has the expected 
effects on global real economic activity, improving the efficiency of international resource 
allocation for the benefit of both sending and receiving countries. Of course these reassuring 
aggregate results mask more complex interactions in domestic labor markets, and there will 
inevitably be both winners and losers from the ensuing structural adjustments. Having said this, 
the existence of substantial aggregate gains, particularly new fiscal resources for the public 
sector, suggests the prospect of adjustment assistance to offset adverse impacts.  
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5 Annex – Adapting the Linkage Model for Migration Studies 
Labor demand 
 
The largest change to the model is on the side of labor demand. The standard version of Linkage 
has labor as a uniform factor of production with a single wage rate (per type of worker, i.e. 
skilled vs. unskilled). The new version of the model identifies workers with an additional index, 
i.e. region of origin, including ‘natives’ as a separate ‘region’.4
 
  
Labor demand by sector is handled the same way as in the standard model, but it is now for a 
bundle of labor that is composed of a mix of natives and migrants. The model employs a nested 
CES structure to derive the demand for labor down to the origin of each worker. First, within the 
sectoral demand for labor, there is a breakdown of total labor demand between native workers 
and foreign-born workers.5
                                                        
4 In composite regions such as the European Union there will be both ‘native’ workers that includes all of those born 
within the European Union as well as European migrant workers, i.e. those born in the European Union but that are 
considered migrants since they don’t work in their country of origin, for example an Italian that is working in France. 
 At this level of decomposition native workers can also include 
foreign-born workers, i.e. close substitutes with natives. This is user-determined, By default, in 
developed countries the ‘native’ worker bundle includes all migrants from other developed 
countries and the ‘foreign-born’ bundle includes all migrants from developing countries. The 
opposite is true in developing countries. All developing country migrants are mapped to the 
‘native’ bundle and all developed country migrants are mapped to the ‘foreign-born’ bundle. 
Figures 1 and 2 depict the decomposition of labor demand by region of origin. 
5 Note that there is nothing in the data that allows for this decomposition at the sectoral level, i.e. the share 
parameters are determined at the national level and applied uniformly across sectors. The model can handle sectoral 
differences were data to become available. 
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Notes: 1. Top-level CES nest is sector-specific. The second level nest is specified at the national 
level. 
 2. The model allows for perfect substitutability in which case efficiency wages are 
uniform. 
 3. Composite regions are likely to have migrant workers from the same region due to 
aggregation, for example Italians working in France. 
 
Native workers Migrant workers from same region3 Workers from other high-income countries  Workers from developing countries  
‘Native’  ‘Foreign-born’ workers 
Aggregate labor demand1,2 
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Figure 3: Labor decomposition in developing countries 
 
 
Notes: 1. Top-level CES nest is sector-specific. The second level nest is specified at the national 
level. 
 2. The model allows for perfect substitutability in which case efficiency wages are 
uniform. 
 3. Composite regions are likely to have migrant workers from the same region due to 
aggregation, for example Nicaraguans working in El Salvador in the Central American 
region. 
 
Let SLd represent aggregate labor demand in each sector, then the first nest, done at the sector 
level is to decompose this bundle into ‘native’ and ‘foreign-born’ components, indexed by s. The 
first part of equation (1) specifies the sectoral demand for the ‘native’ and ‘foreign-born’ 
bundles, SLSd, where SLd is aggregate labor demand by sector, with an average sectoral wage 
given by SW, the individual bundles receive the wage SWS and the degree of substitution 
between the two bundles is given by  l. The index r represents the region (country) of 
employment, l is the skill level, i is the sector, and s is either ‘ntv’ for the native bundle or ‘fbn’ 
for the foreign-born bundle. The parameter l represents an efficiency parameter that corrects for 
differences in base year average returns. The model allows for perfect substitution between the 
Native workers Migrant workers from same region3 Workers from other developing countries Workers from high-income countries  
‘Native’  ‘Foreign-born’ workers 
Aggregate labor demand1,2 
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two bundles. In this case, the first order CES condition is replaced with the law-of-one price, 
adjusted by any differences in efficiency. 
 
Equation (2) represents the aggregation condition for sectoral labor, here transformed into the 
CES dual price formulation in the case of a finite elasticity. For an infinite elasticity, the 





































































































The two respective bundles are now decomposed by region of origin (including natives). First, 
the ‘ntv’ and ‘fbn’ bundles are aggregated across sectors—since it is assumed that their 
decomposition by region of origin is not sector-specific.7
                                                        
6 Note that both equations can be collapsed to a single revenue equation that holds irrespective of the elasticity 
value, i.e. 
 Equation (3) determines the national 
total demand for the two bundles, TLSd, by summing across all sectors. The decomposition by 
region of origin is then given by equation (5) where TLRd represents the demand for labor (of 
skill l) from region rt (that encompasses natives and every country/region being modeled) in 
country/region of employment r. There is a mapping of rt to either of the two bundles indexed by 
s that is specific to each region as described above. The average wage for the ‘ntv’ and ‘fbn’ 
bundles is given by TWS and is uniform across sectors, with the nominal wage paid to each 
worker given by W. There is an efficiency parameter that adjusts for base year wage differentials 





ilrilr SLSSWSSLSW ,,,,,,,,,,  
7 Anecdotal evidence certainly suggests that workers from specific regions work in specific 
sectors, perhaps as a result of tradition, self-selection, social network effects, or other reasons. 
However, there is no data currently available in the global context to support such a sectoral 
decomposition of labor by region of origin. 
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across workers. As above, the model allows for perfect substitutability in which case the demand 
equation is replaced by the law-of-one price (efficiency adjusted). Equation (5) represents the 
aggregation expressions for both the finite and infinite substitution possibilities where in the case 
of the former, the CES dual price expression replaces the primal aggregation function. Equation 

















































































































 (6) slrsilr TWSSWS ,,,,, =  
Wages are assumed flexible and supply is fixed in any given period, hence equation (7) reflects 
the labor market equilibrium condition. This closes the labor side of the changes to the model 
(apart from changes needed to income distribution expressions). 
 (7) s rtlr
d
rtlr TLRTLR ,,,, =  
The only other change to the model is the incorporation of remittances. These are bilateral and 
are fixed (using base year levels) as a share of labor income, equation (8). Note that in equation 
(8) the index r' is used instead of rt. The set r' is a subset of rt that excludes natives. 
 (8) d rlrrlr
rmt
rlrrlr TLRWRMT ',,',,',,',, α=  
 
Welfare decomposition 
Income is defined for each 3-tuplet identified by the region of destination, r, the skill level, l, and 
the source region (or region of origin), rt. The set rt encompasses all of the model’s regions plus 
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so-called ‘native’ workers. Labor income is unambiguously identified in the model as the 
product of the market wage times the quantity of labor for each (l,rt) pair in region r, equation 
(1). Net labor income is somewhat more difficult to determine since nothing in the data or in the 
model allows us to identify household (or worker) specific direct tax rates. In the default welfare 
decomposition it is assumed that all workers pay the same uniform tax and thus net labor income 
is simply the tax-adjusted total labor income, equation (2). 
 
The allocation of capital income across households requires additional assumptions. Aggregate 
capital income equals income from capital, land and other factors of production, equation (3). It 
is allocated to workers, (l,rt) pair according to the distribution matrix given by y. In the default 
welfare decomposition, it is assumed that all capital income accrues to native households in 
proportion to their labor income. Net capital income is equal to the total adjusted for direct taxes. 
 
The final source of income is remittances. It is assumed that all incoming remittances accrue to 
native households only and within the same skill group, i.e. skilled workers send back 
remittances to skilled native households, etc. Equation (5) represents the incoming remittance 
income for natives, where the remittance share matrix (as a share of labor income earned abroad) 
is calibrated to base year flows. Notice the inversion of the region indices. Equation (5) 
represents the flow of remittances into region r from all of the other regions. The variable Ls 
represents the baseline (or BaU) level of migrants, whereas MigrNew represents the new migrants 
from the shock scenario. In the baseline MigrNew is 0 and therefore equation (5) holds for all 
scenarios. Equation (6) represents out remittances, the flip side of in remittances—for only the 
migrants in the baseline, not the new migrants.  
 
 (1) s rtlrrtlr
t
rtlr LWLabY ,,,,,, =  
 (2) t rtlr
hkn
rtlr LabYLabY ,,,, )1( κχ−=  
 (3) [ ]DeprYFYTYKYKapY y rtlrt rtlr −++= ,,,, α  
 (4) thkn rtlr rtlrKapYKapY ,,)1(,, κχ−=  
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ntvlr MigrLWRMT α  




rlr LWRMT ,',,',,',,',, α=  
 







rtlrrtlr RMTRMTKapYLabYY ,,,,,,,,,, −++=  
It is this amount that is spent on private expenditures on goods and services. These expenditures 
are deflated and adjusted for PPP differences in subsequent steps. However, before getting to the 
price adjustments, we add to the welfare calculations the welfare that is derived from public 
expenditures on goods and services—under various assumptions. 
 
Aggregate government expenditure is given by equation (8). 
 (8) ∑=
i
GovirGovirr XAfPAfG ,,,,  
Two adjustments are made for the welfare calculation. The first adjustment is to calculate 
government expenditures for the remaining population in the sending countries. Thus for 
remaining workers in developing countries, government expenditures are determined in equation 
(9) for the baseline, i.e. the total government expenditure accruing to remaining workers where 
the first term is the average per capita expenditure in the baseline and the term in brackets 
represents the population that stays. Equation (10) represents the government expenditures in the 


































The next step is to calculate what government expenditures accrue to the new migrants in their 
new home. There are three options that bracket the possibilities. The default option is fiscal 
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neutrality, i.e. the new migrants receive public benefits in the same amount as they pay in taxes. 
On the low end, the alternative assumption is that new migrants receive no public benefits. On 
the upper end it is assumed that new migrants receive the average across the entire population. 
 
The calculation of taxes paid by the new migrants takes into account indirect as well as direct 
taxes. Equation (11) provides total taxes paid by the new migrants in developed countries. The 
first term in brackets per capita taxes including both indirect and direct taxes, and this is applied 
to each migrant household. Finally, in shock simulations, total government expenditures on 
natives and ‘old’ migrants is given by total government expenditures less expenditures on new 
migrants. 
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Indirect taxes are calculated via residual, i.e. total expenditures less direct taxes (since in this 
model government savings are zero). The share parameter, cind, represents the share of the new 
migrants labor income in total labor income. 
 
To summarize—there are two broad regions developed and developing. In the developed regions 
there are four prototypical households—natives, ‘old’ high-income migrants, ‘old’ developing 
country migrants and ‘new’ developing country migrants. Welfare of natives and old migrants 
involves calculating net after tax income plus their share of government expenditures. In 
developing regions there are three prototypical households—remaining natives and remaining 
developed and developing country migrants. 
The price adjustment for natives—all in the case of developed, and remaining in the case of 
developing countries, and for the ‘old’ migrants simply implies taking their nominal 
expenditures (on private goods and services, savings and public goods and services) and 
deflating by the consumer price index. Government expenditures are deflated by a separate 
government expenditure price deflator. 
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The final adjustment regards price adjustments for new migrants. This is the so-called PPP 
adjustment. Even if the migrant sees a sharp rise in net take-home pay, prices in the new country 
for goods and services are also typically much higher as well and it is this price difference that is 
caught in the PPP exchange rate. This has important implications for welfare analysis and 
remittances. In some sense, the worst outcome from a (macro) welfare point of view is if the new 
migrants spend all of their new earnings in their new (and more expensive) countries of 
employment and residence—because the new earnings, from a welfare point of view, will be 
discounted by the PPP exchange rate. For example, say income goes from $1000 to $10000, or 
an increase of $9000 and there is a unique good priced at $1 in the home country but at $3 in the 
new country. Welfare, instead of increasing by $9000, will increase by $2,333, or only 26% as 
much without the PPP adjustment.8 The best outcome from a welfare point of view is to 
maximize remittances, because these funds are used to purchase ‘cheaper’ goods and services.9
 
 
To some extent, this is what border migrants benefit from—higher wages in the developed 
country but living and buying goods in the cheaper home country. 
The following set of tables captures these different steps in the decomposition of the welfare 
gains. Table 1 shows the change in nominal income for sets of households—natives and ‘old’ 
migrants from other high-income countries in high-income countries, developing country ‘old’ 
migrants in high-income countries, natives and migrants in developing countries that do not 
migrate and the new migrants. Several findings emerge from this table. First, labor income for 
natives and ‘old’ migrants in developed countries decline—though for the natives, this is more 
than offset by an increase in the returns to relatively scarcer capital. Government expenditures, 
that are held constant as a share of GDP, decline for these same households because they are 
spread over a wider population including the new migrants. Total net income drops by around 
$100 billion for ‘old’ developing country migrants, somewhat offset by a rise of $88 billion of 
natives and other high-income migrants. 
 
                                                        
8 The former consumption of $1000 must also be PPP-adjusted, so the original $1000 can only purchase $333 units. 
9 The model and welfare calculations do adjust for real appreciation effects, which in some countries have been 
observed and can be substantial—perhaps even more so at a sub-regional level. 
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Developing countries benefit from two channels. First, the now scarcer labor enjoys greater 
returns, to the tune of $148 billion, offset only marginally by a decline in returns to capital. The 
second channel is net remittance increases, some $77 billion in nominal terms. Government 
expenditures for the remaining population also increase since they are constant as a share of 
GDP. 
 
The new migrants see a huge increase in net nominal labor income—almost $500 billion. Nearly 
20 percent of this is sent back to their home countries. They also benefit from an increase in 
government expenditures of some $144 billion, bringing their net income increase in nominal 
terms to $520 billion. For the world as a whole, the aggregate benefit from more efficient 





Table A1: Increase in nominal expenditures on private and public goods and services, 
$2001 million 
 







       
 Developed countries      
Natives and other high income 
migrants 228 -88 1 141 -52 88 
Developing country migrants 0 -118 22 -96 -4 -99 
Total 228 -206 22 45 -56 -11 
              
 Developing countries      
All households that don’t 
migrate -9 148 77 217 40 257 
              
0 New migrants 476 -100 376 144 520 
              
219 Global 418 0 637 128 765 
When evaluated at constant prices, real income gains decline from $765 billion to $604 billion. 
In the case of high-income countries, the drop in domestic prices induced by the increased labor 
raises the gains in real terms—so that instead of a total loss of $11 billion, there is a gain of some 
$28 billion. For developing countries, the price impacts go in the opposite direction taking their 
net gains to $134 billion in real terms instead of $257 billion in nominal terms. For the new 
migrants, the largest single adjustment is the benefit of government services—taking their net 
down from $520 billion to $443 billion. The price adjustment to remittances is some what 
surprising since it doesn’t have much of an impact. This is due to aggregation across different 




Table A2: Increase in real expenditures on private and public goods and services, $2001 
million 
       







       
 Developed countries      
Natives and other high income 
migrants 212 -92 1 121 -4 117 
Developing country migrants 0 -112 24 -89 0 -89 
Total 212 -204 24 32 -4 28 
              
 Developing countries      
All households that don’t 
migrate -50 94 75 119 15 134 
              
0 New migrants 445 -100 345 97 443 
              
161 Global 334 0 496 108 604 
 
The final adjustment is to the increase in net real income accruing to the new migrants when 
adjusting for the higher prices in their country of destination. This is shown in Table 3. Most of 
the entries are identical in both tables 2 and 3 save for the income and government benefit 
columns. When adjusted for price differentials, income to the new migrants (in real terms) 
declines from $443 billion to $253 billion and government benefits drop from $97 billion to $40 
billion. In total, the net benefit to the new migrants10
 
  drops to $193 billion from $443 billion, 
with a final global gain of $355 billion—an increase of 0.7% of relative to the baseline (in 2025). 
                                                        
10 Assuming the welfare benefits of the remittances accrue to households in the country of origin and not the migrant. 
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Table A3: Increase in real expenditures on private and public goods and services with PPP 
adjustment, $2001 million 
       







       
 Developed countries      
Natives and other high income 
migrants 212 -92 1 121 -4 117 
Developing country migrants 0 -112 24 -89 0 -89 
Total 212 -204 24 32 -4 28 
              
 Developing countries      
All households that don’t 
migrate -50 94 75 119 15 134 
              
0 New migrants 253 -100 153 40 193 
              
161 Global 143 0 304 51 355 
 
